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Abstract
The competition in international food markets is increasingly moving towards products with higher levels 
of added value and higher degrees of differentiation, requiring companies to become more market-oriented. 
Market orientation is ‘the extent to which an actor in the marketplace uses knowledge about the market, 
especially about customers, as a basis for decision-making on what to produce, how to produce it, and how 
to market it’. Market orientation comprises three constructs: market intelligence generation, dissemination 
and responsiveness. Value chain governance can facilitate market orientation requirements. Value chain 
governance includes network governance, contracting and informal relationships. Knowledge about how 
governance can facilitate a value chain’s market orientation is limited. Therefore, the aim of this study is to 
explore how the governance of a global food value chain can facilitate the value chain’s market orientation. 
The study applies a multiple case study design. Four in-depth case studies were conducted on global food 
value chains from New Zealand to Western Europe dealing with the products apples, kiwis, venison and 
lamb. Interviews were conducted with actors from these four value chains in the Netherlands as well as in 
New Zealand. In each value chain actors with similar functions were interviewed in order to make the results 
comparable. Analysis of the case studies shows that network governance (i.e. leadership, shared governance and 
facilitation), contractual agreements (i.e. type and content: price, volume, quality) and informal relationships 
(i.e. trust and commitment) can contribute to the market orientation of a value chain. Leaderships and shared 
governance, in combination with good informal relationships in the chain, as well as contractual incentives, 
are main contributors to market orientation in global fresh food value chains. The paper adds to the still very 
scarce literature on governance of value chains and market orientation of value chains.
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1. Introduction
The competition in international food markets is increasingly moving toward products with higher levels 
of added value and higher degrees of differentiation, requiring companies to become more market-oriented 
(Grunert et al., 1996). A market-oriented company aims to continuously deliver superior value to its customers 
(Han et al., 1998) ‘by identifying and satisfying customer needs more effectively than its competitors’ (Kirca 
et al., 2005). In this way, the company tries to create competitive advantage (Grunert et al., 2005).
Market requirements, i.e. requirements for the final customer, should be coordinated in the chain by a 
suitable governance structure (Elg, 2008; Grunert et al., 2005; Trienekens and Wognum, 2013). Governance 
mechanisms may include formal arrangements (contracts: Wever, 2012) and informal arrangements such as 
trust and reputation (Lu, 2012; Trienekens et al., 2012). The study of these mechanisms has so far focused 
primarily on the dyad. In studying value chains as entities we need to extend this view to mechanisms that 
cover the chain end-to-end.
The objective of the paper is to explore the relationships between market orientation and governance of 
international fresh food chains, based on an in-depth analysis of four fresh food export chains from New 
Zealand to Europe. The paper adds to the still very scarce literature on market orientation of value chains 
and (related) value chain governance.
2. Market orientation and governance
2.1 Market orientation
Two main definitions of market orientation can be distinguished: namely, one from a behavioural perspective 
and one from a cultural perspective (Homburg and Pflesser, 2000; Kirca et al., 2005; Vieira, 2010). Kohli 
and Jaworski (1990) defined market orientation in terms of organisational behaviour and stated that market 
orientation comprises three types of activities, namely market intelligence generation, dissemination and 
responsiveness. Narver and Slater (1990) defined market orientation in terms of organisational culture and 
stated that market orientation comprises customer orientation, competitor orientation and inter-functional 
coordination. These are organisational norms and values which encourage behaviour that is in line with 
market orientation (Kirca et al., 2005).
Recently, there has been an increasing interest in market orientation from a value chain perspective (Elg, 
2008; Grunert et al., 2005, 2010). This interest is relevant, since the degree of market orientation of one 
company in the value chain can be influenced by the degree of market orientation of other actors in the value 
chain (Grunert et al., 2005). Additionally, in the global business environment, competition is transiting from 
company level to value chain level (Green Jr et al., 2006; Jain and Benyoucef, 2008). Therefore, in order to 
offer superior value to the market, companies need to collaborate with other value chain actors and develop 
an inter-firm strategy for market-orientation (Elg, 2008).
Grunert et al. (2005) used the definition of Kohli and Jaworski (1990) to define market orientation from 
a value chain perspective as ‘chain members’ generation of intelligence pertaining to current and future 
end-user needs, dissemination of this intelligence across chain members, and chain wide responsiveness 
to it’. In this definition, intelligence generation refers to all activities conducted by value chain members 
aimed at gathering information on end-users, typically consumers, customers and competitors (Grunert et 
al., 2005). This gathered information is also called market information. Dissemination or communication 
of intelligence refers to all exchanges of information on consumers, customers and competitors between 
value chain members (Grunert et al., 2005). Responsiveness includes the actions of value chain members in 
response to the gathered market information to create superior value for consumers and customers (Grunert 
et al., 2005). Effective communication or dissemination is a prerequisite for responsiveness in the chain, 
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since responsiveness is only possible if market information is effectively shared in the value chain (Kähkönen 
and Tenkanen, 2010).
2.2 Value chain governance
Value chain governance may facilitate market orientation (Elg, 2008; Grunert et al., 2005). However, 
knowledge about this subject is limited (Elg, 2008; Karami et al., 2015). So far most of the literature on the 
governance of inter-business relationships has focused on bilateral buyer-supplier relationships (Menard, 
2004; Wever, 2012; Williamson, 1991).
One stream in the value chain literature that goes beyond the dyad is the global value chain approach, focusing 
on the governance of end-to-end value chains (Dolan and Humphrey, 2004; Gereffi et al., 2005; Gibbon 
et al., 2008; Kaplinsky, 2000). Gereffi et al. (2005) defined the complexity of information and knowledge 
transfer required to sustain a particular transaction as explanatory factors for governance choices in global 
value chains, thereby underlining the important role of lead parties and power asymmetry in these chains. 
If we consider the current practice, power normally lies with large organisations downstream of the value 
chain, such as retail or marketing and distribution organisations, or with large manufacturing firms. Suppliers, 
such as farmers, rarely have a powerful position in value chains (Ponte and Sturgeon, 2014). Lead firms are 
the main decision takers as regards requirements on quality, quantity and timing of delivery and pricing. 
Power can result from different sources, distinguishing between sources of coercive and non-coercive power 
(Hunt and Nevin, 1974; Leonidou et al., 2008). The main difference between the two is that for sources 
of non-coercive power, individuals willingly yield power to another individual (non-aggressive), while for 
coercive power there are potential punishments which makes individuals yield power to another individual 
(aggressive) (Hunt and Nevin, 1974; Leonidou et al., 2008). However, the literature on the governance 
of end-to-end value chains is scarce. Therefore, and as we consider value chains as netchains (Lazzarini, 
2001), including horizontal and vertical relationships covering the chain end-to-end, we include network 
governance in our theoretical approach.
Network governance can be defined as ‘the set of mechanisms that supports and sustains cooperation among 
participating organisations to enhance the likelihood of achieving network-level goals’ (Alvarez et al., 
2010). Networks focus on improving collaboration between organisations in the network, which can lead to 
better alignment of, among other things, supply and demand in the value chain (Barratt, 2004). Therefore, 
it is likely that network governance can facilitate market orientation of a value chain. Provan and Kenis 
(2008) explored different forms of network governance and propose that these can be categorised along 
two dimensions. First, network governance may or may not be brokered. At one extreme, in case of highly 
brokered network governance, there are few direct organisation-to-organisation interactions. In this case a 
single organisation is responsible for the governance of the network and thereby takes a leadership position 
(Provan and Kenis, 2008). At the other extreme, within lowly brokered network governance, the network 
can be governed by all the organisations within the network. In this case, every organisation interacts with 
all other organisations in order to govern the network (Provan and Kenis, 2008). The second dimension 
along which network governance forms can be categorised is whether the network is externally governed 
or participant governed. In the case of externally governed networks, an organisation that is not involved in 
the network activities is responsible for the governance of the network. Within the dimension of participant-
governed networks, the network might be governed by a single (lead) organisation or by all organisations 
that comprise the network (shared governance) (Provan and Kenis, 2008).
The global value chain literature underlines the importance of lead parties, information exchange and supplier 
capabilities in the explanation of value chain governance structures. In the network literature; lead parties, 
shared governance (and information exchange) and network facilitation are key elements to explain network 
governance. For our current research we select three network governance constructs, namely leadership, 
shared governance and facilitation. Leadership reflects one actor in the value chain, being the leader or 
‘channel captain’. There is a power asymmetry as the actor taking the leadership role has more power than 
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the other chain actors. The leader is responsible for coordinating major network-level activities and key 
decisions (Gereffi et al., 2005; Provan and Kenis, 2008). Shared governance reflects actors being responsible 
for governing (part of) the network together (Provan and Kenis, 2008) and communication and information 
exchange between these actors (Gereffi et al., 2005). In this paper, facilitation reflects the provision of actors 
in the value chain with all kinds of support, such as access to particular information, assistance or provision 
of infrastructure (Leonidou et al., 2008). The need for facilitation also reflects the capabilities of the chain 
actors (Gereffi et al., 2005).
 ■ Contracting
Different types of contracts can be distinguished, such as spot-market contracts, verbal agreements, formal 
contracts, equity-based contracts and vertical integration (Raynaud et al., 2005; Wever et al., 2010). Transaction 
Cost Economics (Williamson, 1991) has often been applied to study bilateral (i.e. buyer-supplier) governance 
mechanisms (Grunert et al., 2011; Ménard, 2004; Raynaud et al., 2009). In spot markets, coordination 
takes place via price and competition (Martinez and Zering, 2004; Williamson, 1991). At the other end of 
the continuum, hierarchies reflect vertical integration of two companies, in which there is coordination via 
administrative control with associated monitoring rights (Raynaud et al., 2005; Wever et al., 2010; Williamson, 
1991). Hybrids, such as partnerships and alliances, are in between these two extremes (Ménard, 2004). The 
degree of coordination or control increases from spot markets to hierarchies (Trienekens and Wognum, 2013). 
Market orientation requires intelligence generation, intelligence dissemination and responsiveness of the 
actors in the value chain (Grunert et al., 2005). Therefore, certain contract attributes may be more suitable 
for facilitating market orientation than others, for example contracts that enable firms to flexibly respond 
to market requirement, i.e. contracts that can be responsive in price, quality and/or delivery requirements. 
Specific investments, for example, in company shares, can also be explanatory major reason for the choice 
of governance structures (Williamson, 1991; Wever et al., 2012); in many cases these often lead to more 
integrated structures. In addition, behavioural and demand/supply uncertainty are transaction attributes 
impacting on the governance choice (Williamson, 1991; Wever et al., 2012). Behavioural uncertainty (e.g. 
opportunistic behaviour of actors) can be decreased through stricter coordination of transactions, i.e. through 
more hybrid-type or hierarchical types of bilateral agreements (i.e. formal written contracts, equity-based 
contracts, vertical integration) (Wever, 2012). In contrast, demand or supply uncertainty would require more 
flexibility and less strict contracts.
 ■ Informal coordination mechanisms
Besides formal relationships (e.g. through contracts) there are also informal relationships between actors in a 
value chain (Alvarez et al., 2010; Lu, 2012; Trienekens et al., 2012). Trust and commitment can be identified 
as relevant aspects influencing the degree of market orientation. Informal relationships, including trust and 
commitment, can be beneficial for the exchange of information and thereby facilitate a value chain’s market 
orientation (Grunert et al., 2010; Jeong and Hong, 2007).
Trust can be defined as ‘the degree to which a firm believes that its trading partner is honest and/or benevolent’ 
(Bigne and Blesa, 2003). Grunert et al. (2010) studied the market orientation of decision makers in two 
cross-border value chains, namely Norwegian salmon exported to Japan and Danish pork exported to Japan. 
The research showed that trust creates openness and thereby enhances information exchange between actors 
in the value chain, contributing to intelligence communication (Grunert et al., 2010). Micheels and Gow 
(2011) studied the relationship between market orientation and performance by conducting surveys of beef 
producers in the United States. It was found that trust between actors in the value chain directly contributed 
to market orientation and indirectly contributed to the performance of a company. More specifically, trust 
contributed to the exchange of market information (Micheels and Gow, 2011).
Commitment can be defined as ‘an exchange partner believing that an ongoing relationship with another 
is so important as to warrant maximum efforts at maintaining it; that is, the committed party believes the 
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relationship endures indefinitely’ (Morgan and Hunt, 1994). In addition to trust, commitment can be an 
important antecedent of the degree of market orientation of a value chain, since commitment can stimulate 
effective market information exchange in a value chain (Grunert et al., 2005; Micheels and Gow, 2011). The 
reason for this is that commitment creates openness in the value chain (Grunert et al., 2010). Kähkönen and 
Tenkanen (2010) studied the impact of power on information sharing in the Finnish food industry. It was 
concluded that a lack of commitment or one-sided commitment decreases the willingness to share information 
in the value chain (Kähkönen and Tenkanen, 2010). Kwon and Suh (2005) studied the relationships between 
trust, commitment and various aspects of value chain management. It was observed that commitment is 
needed between value chain actors in order to achieve common goals (Kwon and Suh, 2005); in this case, 
a particular degree of market orientation. Trust and commitment are interrelated, since trust contributes to 
commitment (Karami et al., 2015; Kwon and Suh, 2005; Micheels and Gow, 2011; Ryu et al., 2009).
3. Theoretical framework
In our research we measured market orientation through three constructs based on (Grunert et al., 2005; 
Kohli and Jaworski, 1990): market intelligence, market responsiveness and market communication.
Three basic elements of value chain governance are distinguished: (bilateral) contracts throughout the 
chain, informal coordination mechanisms and network governance. Based on Wever (2012) we define 
three components of contracts: price, volume and quality. Furthermore, we include trust and commitment 
as informal coordination mechanisms (Bigne and Blesa, 2003; Karami et al., 2015; Kwon and Su, 2005; 
Micheels and Gow, 2011). Network governance includes leadership, shared governance and facilitation. 
This brought us to the following conceptual model of our research.
Figure 1 shows the main concepts and the main relationships to be expected based on theoretical considerations. 
We expect that network governance may impact on the collection of market information (market intelligence), 
market communication (upstream of the value chain) and market responsiveness (throughout the chain). 
We expect that network governance (all three components) may have a (positive) effect on trust between 
the value chain actors and commitment of these actors. Trust and commitment, for their part, will have a 
positive effect on the communication of market information throughout the chain. Facilitation (one of the 
elements of network governance) may impact on the type of arrangements and support arrangements on 
price, quality and volume (e.g. storage of products). Contractual arrangements will affect the responsiveness 
to the market of actors throughout the chain.
4. Methodology
The research is exploratory, as very little research has been done so far on the relationship between market 
orientation and value chain governance. We analyse four export chains from New Zealand to Western 
Europe on market orientation, value chain governance and the relationship between these concepts. Three 
selection criteria were established for the choice of case studies. First, the value chain needs to be global, 
i.e. the production takes place in a different country from where the produced products are being sold. In 
this way the research addresses the increasing globalization of food value chains (Ren et al., 2014). Second, 
the selected value chains should probably be governed in different ways, in order to create a meaningful 
comparison between the different value chains and to more easily observe contrasting patterns in the data 
(Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). Third, for the same reason as above, the selected value chains should 
probably have different degrees of international market penetration. We investigated two fruit chains and 
two meat chains, which all have primary production stages in New Zealand and marketing and distribution 
stages in North Western Europe. For confidentiality reasons the chains are named A, B (two fruit chains) 
and C, D (two meat chains).
Chain A produces and exports kiwi. It consists of around 2,500 producers, 50 post-harvest operators (pack 
houses and cool store facilities), the global marketing and distribution organisation, and distribution companies 
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around the world. The marketing and distribution company is owned by producers and facilitated by legislation, 
as kiwi producers in New Zealand may only export through this company (with the exception of Australia).
The apple chain B consists of independent or contract growers as well as orchards owned by a large packing 
and distribution company that sells and distributes apples around the world. Growers supply apples to 
37 post-harvest operators (pack houses and cool storage facilities). Some of these pack houses are also 
owned by the marketing and distribution organisation. The marketing and distribution organisation is an 
independent company and a clear leader in this chain. The organisation also owns the plant variety rights of 
two internationally well-known apple varieties. These varieties can only be exported through the marketing 
and distribution organisation. Other varieties can also be exported through other companies.
The venison chain C that we studied consists of 21 deer farmers (both breeders and finishers) which form a 
venison producer group aiming to produce high-quality and sustainable venison for international markets. The 
farmers supply their deer to one independent slaughterhouse. A facilitating company organises processing, 
logistics and marketing (including export). The farmers and this company each own 50% of the value chain 
company that again hires the facilitating company. Distribution and sales in Western Europe is done by a 
high-quality food wholesaler.
The lamb chain D consists of around 25 sheep farmers, including breeders and finishers, who together form 
an association. The farmers collaborate with a veterinarian, who is one of the initiators of the project. The 
farmers aim for sustainable production in terms of animal welfare, social responsibility and environmental 
responsibility. The practices must lead to a consistent and high-quality meat brand for the national as well 
as the international market. The farmers supply their lambs to a large New Zealand meat company, which is 
responsible for processing and the export to the Netherlands. Distribution in the Netherlands is performed 
by a Dutch importer and distribution company. This company tries to distribute the products to high-end 
butcher shops and wholesalers, supplying high-end restaurants, at premium prices.
Figure 1. Conceptual model.
Market orientation
Type of arrangement
Price
Volume
Quality
Facilitation
Leadership
Shared governance
- Trust
- Commitment
Market responsiveness
Market intelligence
Market communication
Contracts (bilateral)
Informal coordination
Network 
governance 
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Table 1. List of interviewees.
Apple value chain
1. Manager of orchard owned by distribution organisation
2. CEO of orchards, pack house and cool store facilities recently acquired by distribution organisation
3. Value chain manager distribution organisation New Zealand
4. Marketing manager distribution organisation Benelux
Kiwi value chain
1. Kiwi grower
2. Director of pack house and cool store
3. Value chain manager distribution organisation New Zealand
4. Marketing manager distribution organisation New Zealand
Venison value chain
1. Deer farmer
2. CEO venison exporter and chain coordinator
3. Marketing manager Deer Industry New Zealand
4. Manager of game meat at wholesaler in the Netherlands
Lamb value chain
1. Sheep farmer
2. Marketing manager lamb processor and exporter 
3. Importer and distributor in the Netherlands
Table 2. Operationalisation of market orientation concepts.
Market 
orientation 
concepts
Indicators Literature
Intelligence 
generation
Market research on customer and consumer wishes and 
needs
(Bigne and Blesa, 2003; Deshpandé 
and Farley, 1998; Deshpandé et al., 
1993; Grunert et al., 2005; Jaworski 
and Kohli, 1993; Matsuno et al., 
2005; Narver and Slater, 1990; 
Tomášková, 2009)
Measurement of customer and consumer satisfaction
Meetings with customers and consumers
Meetings with industry partners
Research on competitors’ actions
Frequency of performing these activities 
Intelligence 
communication
Wishes of customers and consumers (Bigne and Blesa, 2003; Grunert et 
al., 2005; Jaworski and Kohli, 1993; 
Matsuno et al., 2005)
Customer and consumer satisfaction
Trends in consumer wishes
Competitors’ actions
Complaints
Sales volumes
Frequency of sharing and receiving information
Responsiveness New product development driven by market information (Bigne and Blesa, 2003; Deshpandé 
et al., 1993; Grunert et al., 2005; 
Jaworski and Kohli, 1993; Matsuno et 
al., 2005; Tomášková, 2009)
Periodic review of whether products are in line with 
consumers’ wishes
Adapting products to consumers’ or customers’ wishes 
and complaints
Adapting products or prices in response to competitors’ 
actions
Timing of response
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The concepts in Figure 1 have been applied in a questionnaire that has been used for in-depth interviews along 
all four value chains, in New Zealand as well as in Western Europe. Next to the analysis of ample secondary 
material on the four sectors, 20 interviews were performed along these four chains. Interviews were in-depth 
and lasted between 1.5 and 3.5 hours. The aim was to get precise information about governance mechanisms 
and market orientation from different perspectives (different functions) along the chains.
In Table 1, an overview is provided of the interviewees. The interviewees were selected based on their role in 
the value chain and their ability to oversee (different stages of) the value chain. The interviews were performed 
in the last quarter of 2015 (September-November). For the lamb value chain only three interviews were 
conducted, since for this value chain extensive information was already available from Van Vlerken (2015).
Table 3. Operationalisation of value chain governance concepts.
Value chain 
governance concepts
Indicators Literature
Network governance
Leadership Decision taking (Provan and Kenis, 2008)
Initiate decision taking
Organisation of meetings
Shared governance Meetings between several members (Provan and Kenis, 2008)
Main agenda of meetings
Frequency of meetings
Facilitator Facilitation with knowledge, resources, financial rewards (Leonidou et al., 2008)
Contracts
Type of agreement Spot-market contract (Raynaud et al., 2005; Wever, 
2012)Verbal agreement
Formal written contract
Equity-based contract
Vertical integration
Price agreements Specifications of agreement (Wever, 2012)
Which actor sets price?
Duration of price agreements
Criteria used for price setting
Circumstances under which agreement can be changed
Volume agreements Specifications of agreement (Wever, 2012)
Duration of volume agreements
Circumstances under which agreement can be changed
Quality agreements Requests from customers to change quality (Wever, 2012)
Response to requests to change quality
Informal relationships
Trust Role of trust (Kwon and Suh, 2005; 
Micheels and Gow, 2011)Confidence about accuracy and correctness of information
Compliance with agreements
Other actors take your interests into account when taking 
decisions
Commitment Role of commitment (Kwon and Suh, 2005; 
Micheels and Gow, 2011)Dedication of time, effort and resources to support others
Willingness to make long-term investments when other 
actors wish to
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Interviewees were contacted via e-mail or by telephone to invite them to participate and to give them an 
explanation of the research. If the interviewee was willing to cooperate, an appointment for the interview 
was planned. Before the actual interview was conducted the questionnaire was sent to the interviewee for 
the purposes of preparation.
Interviews were semi-structured, which means that in addition to questions prepared beforehand, there 
was room for additional questions based on answers from the interviewee. At the start of each interview, 
permission was requested for recording. Additionally, a concise description of the research was provided 
and an indication was given about topics to be discussed during the interview. The topics to be discussed in 
the interviews were derived from the theoretical framework described in section 3 of this paper.
Tables 2 and 3 show operationalisation of the concepts from the theoretical model. Indicators and related 
questions were based on the literature as much as possible.
5. Results
5.1 Market orientation
 ■ Intelligence generation
In the kiwi chain (A) the marketing and distribution company applies intensive intelligence generation: 
different types of research, namely consumer usage and consumer attitudes research, annual tracking of 
markets (consumption trends for kiwis, consumer brand awareness, loyalty and engagement), pre-campaign 
testing (consumer perception and purchase intention), post-campaign analysis (consumer recap of campaign 
and buying behaviour), conduction of category information (sales volumes), in-store sampling (consumer 
liking, purchase intention and comparison to competitors), sensory testing with consumers (at the launch 
of a new cultivar), monitoring quality and price of kiwis of competitors (firmness and dry matter), research 
into specific areas (convenience, taste and brand), feedback from customers about markets, performance of 
kiwis, complaints, and interactions with consumers via social media.
In the apple chain (B) the marketing and distribution organisation conducts market research approximately once 
every five years, when a new variety is developed (sensory research, product name, etc.). Furthermore, there 
are regular meetings between customers and a regional manager in Europe, to discuss market developments 
and customer satisfaction. At events and fairs consumers can taste apples.
Venison chain C conducted market research with restaurant chefs in Europe before the launch of their 
products. They have also appointed ambassador chefs who provide market information (quality of venison, 
positioning, consumer satisfaction) and encourage consumers to give feedback. Venison workshops for chefs 
and promotions in restaurants are also organised. The industry body, which supports chain C, gathers full 
sales data from the distribution company in the Netherlands. Moreover, research is conducted (by the industry 
body) on customer preferences and restaurant chefs’ and consumer usage and attitudes towards venison. In 
addition, consumer comments are tracked in the press and social media. Feedback from customers about 
satisfaction, complaints, trends in the market and competitor prices are also researched. Interactions with 
consumers via social media have so far had less success.
The lamb chain (D) has not performed market research on opportunities in the Netherlands and customer 
required product specifications before the launch of the meat product. Feedback from customers on product 
quality comes from the importer. There is, however, no feedback from customers’ customers (i.e. restaurants). 
Prices of other New Zealand lamb products are monitored. Limited research is conducted on customer 
satisfaction with chilled lamb. In addition, market research is done by a marketing consultant on customer 
and consumer opinions about the lamb production. So far interactions with consumers via social media have 
not been successful.
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 ■ Intelligence communication
The marketing and distribution company of the kiwi chain (A) receives information from customers and 
their European subsidiary: outcomes of market research, complaints, feedback on performance, prices and 
quality of competitors. It communicates this information to the breeding company, growers and post-harvest 
operators via industry consultation groups (growers, post-harvest operators, marketing organisation), company 
website, online seminars, magazines, and during annual tours (‘road shows’) and meetings.
The European subsidiary of the apple chain (B) updates the head office in New Zealand about the market 
situation on a weekly basis, via e-mail, on prices and stock levels. Twice a year both parties meet in New 
Zealand. Growers are kept up-to-date on situations in the market via e-mail and via the company’s supply 
representatives, who regularly visit the growers to advise them and receive crop estimates. Occasionally 
customers visit growers and pack houses, where market information is discussed.
The chain facilitator of the venison chain (C) receives sales data and restaurant feedback from the industry 
body and market information from the European distribution organisation (such as sales of particular cuts). 
Market information is shared during meetings, visits by stakeholders (farmers, facilitator and customers) 
and via daily e-mail contact with customers. The facilitator shares information with the slaughterhouse when 
there is a problem or change in product specifications. Market information with farmers is communicated 
through an industry magazine.
In the lamb chain (D) the importer shares feedback from customers (e.g. on product specifications, such as 
cuts, size, labelling), prices of competitors, market development and possible aspects for improvement with 
the processing company via e-mail (and in some cases, also with farmers). The processing company shares 
relevant market information with farmers via e-mail or telephone and occasionally in face-to-face meetings. 
Within the group of farmers, information is also shared via an online forum. Farmers and the processing 
company would like to receive more market information.
 ■ Responsiveness
In the kiwi chain (A) a lot of attention is paid to breeding of new kiwi varieties, in line with consumer wishes. 
Setting standards (e.g. size, dry matter, firmness) and incentive systems for growers and post-harvest operators 
is also based on consumer wishes and competitor actions. The establishment of plans for optimal ripening 
takes place for storage in New Zealand, transportation and in the market, in response to customer feedback 
on the firmness of kiwis. The company responds to wishes for year-round supply by having growers in the 
Northern and Southern hemisphere.
In the apple chain (B) price changes or new competition are always discussed with the head office before 
action is undertaken (e.g. lower prices). Responsiveness to consumer requirements takes place through the 
development of new apple varieties (which take at least three years). Moreover, the company tries to have 
orchards/contracts in the Northern as well as the Southern hemisphere in order to guarantee year-round supply.
The industry body for the venison chain (C) supported the idea of telling the product story in a trial in 2016 
based on restaurant feedback. In addition, the industry body is developing a national QA programme in 
response to customer feedback. Changes in packaging and storytelling took place after a consumer survey in 
England. Change in product specifications and volumes are based on customer feedback. There is a response 
to complaints, and development of cuts takes place in collaboration with customers. Supply and demand are 
matched in terms of volumes. Prices might be adapted in response to competitor actions.
In the lamb chain (D) the aim is to base changes in product specifications on customer feedback and 
complaints. There was a change from frozen to chilled lamb when New Zealand restaurants were satisfied 
with the quality. However, some Dutch customers were not satisfied with this switch. Although there are 
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customer requests for a larger variety of cuts, the number of cuts has been reduced since it was too costly. 
Supply does not always meet demand. Farmers are not able to respond to customer demand for year-round 
supply. Lamb prices can be adapted in response to competitor prices or customer feedback.
Table 4 gives an overview of the strength of market orientation in the four cases. The kiwi marketing and 
distribution organisation is a well-established global company that is able to generate extensive market 
intelligence and communicate the market intelligence throughout the chain, where this chain includes the 
farmer and packhouse stage in the interaction. In particular, the kiwi chain has developed many activities 
to increase market responsiveness. The apple chain does most market research in relation to the launch of 
new varieties and also pays less attention to chain wide communication and responsiveness compared to 
the kiwi chain. The venison chain has a close collaboration with restaurant chefs in the Western European 
market (including the appointment of ‘ambassador chefs’) to obtain information on the most valued cuts. 
The lamb chain more or less ‘ends’ with the importer in the European market, where the importer hasn’t yet 
built close contacts with parties further downstream of the chain. 
5.2 Value chain governance
 ■ Contracts
Kiwi value chain (A) has formal written contracts throughout the chain. There is also vertical integration 
in this chain as growers are shareholders of post-harvest operators and of the marketing and distribution 
organisation. Volumes of growers are specified in supply agreements. Allocation plans are made to match 
demand and supply in terms of volume, size and pack type. Based on these allocation plans, the company 
allocates pack types and delivery schedules to grower entities and post-harvest operators. Prices are based 
on the pool of market returns for growers. Payments are also based on size and taste/dry matter. There are 
incentives for growers for early harvest and long cold storage. Post-harvest operators have incentives in the 
packing process.
In the apple value chain (B), there are formal written contracts throughout the chain. Agreements on volumes 
of growers are based on production forecasts. Prices are based on a pool of returns for growers. Sometimes 
premiums are payed to growers that aim at markets with tougher requirements (taste, size). With customers 
there are no price agreements; market developments and demand decide the price. To grow the apple varieties 
owned by the marketing and distribution organisation, growers have to pay royalties. The company uses 
several incentives such as a penalty system for lower quality products and a premium for long-term storage 
at growers (to meet demand fluctuations). Post-harvest operators have incentives in the final packaging 
process (timing of packaging).
Venison value chain (C) is organised through verbal agreements and equity-based contracts between 
farmers and the facilitating company. There are formal written contracts between the slaughterhouse and the 
facilitator (on behalf of farmers). Verbal agreements govern the relationship between the facilitator and the 
high-end distributer in Europe. Volumes of farmers are specified in a supply agreement. During the season, 
Table 4. Market orientation in 4 value chains.1
Market intelligence Intelligence communication Responsiveness
Case A: kiwi + + + + ++
Case B: apple ++ + +
Case C: venison ++ ++ +
Case D: lamb +/- +/- -
1 ++: strong attention; +: moderate attention; +/-: limited attention; -: lack of attention.
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the facilitator checks with customers about sales of venison and with farmers about the supply of deer. In 
the event of supply shortages other farmers make up the shortfall, as they are committed to helping each 
other. The farmer base price is based on the returns in the market. Fluctuations in farmer base prices can 
take place during the year to influence the supply of deer by farmers.
Lamb value chain (D) is characterised by verbal agreements. Volumes of farmers are specified in a supply 
agreement. There is a fixed volume agreement between the processing company and the importer/distributor 
in Belgium (1000 lambs per week). Farmers have difficulties living up to these volume agreements. The 
processor tries to push the farmers for a consistent supply. However, there are no penalties when farmers 
don’t comply. Farmers get the market price and a premium per kilogram of live weight of lamb from the 
processor. The processor aims to have a fixed price for the importer, who aims to set monthly prices with 
its customers. Shareholding of farmers is required in order to be part of this lamb chain.
Table 5 depicts the contract elements of the four cases. The most vertically integrated chain is the kiwi value 
chain (A), followed by the venison chain (C) and the apple chain (B). Case D is the least integrated value chain.
 ■ Network governance
In the kiwi chain the market and distribution organisation is the lead company, which is responsible for 
intelligence generation activities, communication of market intelligence, facilitating, setting and checking of 
production standards and incentive systems and management of the product flow. Its basic source of power 
is that it is the single point of entry for New Zealand producers to international markets (with the exception 
of Australia).
Shared governance is strongly supported by intensive communication and consultation between chain actors. 
There are monthly meetings of industry consultation groups where outcomes of market research are discussed 
and fortnightly conferences on quality between market representatives and post-harvest representatives. In 
addition, there is an annual tours programme during which retailers, wholesalers and authorities visit New 
Zealand. Moreover, growers and post-harvest operators visit markets (organised by the lead company as 
well as by post-harvest operators). Grower roadshows are attended by growers, post-harvest operators and 
the lead company three times a year.
The lead company facilitates chain collaboration by giving assistance to growers for the implementation 
of Global GAP, knowledge transfer on growing techniques via grower education systems, workshops and 
online seminars, and intensive production support.
Table 5. Type of contract in the four cases.
Type of agreement Price Volume Quality
Case A: kiwi Written contracts + 
equity based
Based on pool of 
returns
Based on supply 
agreement
Based on size, taste/dry 
matter
Case B: apple Written contracts Based on pool of 
returns
Based on production 
forecasts
Related to market, taste/
size
Case C: venison Verbal and written 
contracts + equity based
Price/kg based on 
returns in market
Based on supply 
agreement
According to quality 
standard
Case D: lamb Verbal and written 
contracts
Market price Based on supply 
agreement
According to quality 
standard
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In the apple chain also, the market and distribution company is the lead party. The company is responsible 
for intelligence generation activities and optimises the product flow (harvest, packaging, storage, transport) 
through planning and a system of incentives. It sets standards for growing and packing the own apple varieties. 
Its source of power is vertical integration, through ownership of several orchards and packing houses, and 
plant variety rights for two major varieties.
It supports shared governance through weekly meetings between managers of owned orchards (about technical 
issues, packing of apples and developments in the market) and monthly meetings between contract growers, 
managers of owned orchards, post-harvest operators and the leading company (about sales, complaints and 
prices). Visits of representatives of the company to post-harvest operators takes place on a weekly or two-
weekly basis (about new packaging and label requirements, changes in market demand, timing of supply). 
Meetings between managers of the company’s subsidiaries in Europe and the head office in New Zealand 
take place twice a year. Grower meetings take place four to six times a year. Annually there are grower 
visits to markets and customer visits to New Zealand. Decisions are taken by the lead company. The lead 
company facilitates chain collaboration through knowledge transfer on growing techniques to growers on 
field days and visits by third party technical people. In addition, the company sends newsletters to growers 
with technical and market requirements.
In the venison chain the facilitator takes the leadership role. It is responsible for some intelligence generation 
activities, connects actors, optimises the product flow and influences the behaviour of other actors (incentive 
systems). These activities are supported by Deer New Zealand which undertakes market research for the 
sector and provides marketing funds to the venison companies. The source of power of the facilitator is the 
trust of farmers in its competences to connect both ends of the value chain, and to develop and maintain all 
relationships in the value chain.
Shared governance is an important issue in this value chain. In the farmer group there is intense communication 
and farmers try to help each other to improve. If a farmer wants to become part of the producer group, other 
farmers can use their veto if they believe that the farmer has a different philosophy or is not able to supply 
according to specifications. Meetings of the producer group and the facilitator take place four times a year 
(discussions about the market, farm management practices, industry-related topics). The Annual General 
Meeting is attended by farmers, the facilitator and one or two customers. Moreover, there is a board meeting 
of farmers and facilitator four times a year (discussions about sales volumes). There are customer visits 
to New Zealand and grower visits to the market (discussions about demand, supply, wishes of consumers, 
complaints, trends in the market, prices, sales volumes, and aspects for improvement). The lead company 
facilitates some market research.
In the lamb chain leadership is less present. The processor tries to optimise the product flow and has developed 
some incentive systems. The main leader in this chain is a farmer who was one of the initiators of the chain. 
However, connections with the market are organised by the slaughterhouse.
Shared governance is supported by communication and consultation between the board of the farmers 
group and the processor several times a year. The Annual General Meeting is attended by farmers and the 
processor. Until now the importer has not taken part in these meetings. Two farmers visited the importer. 
The processor visits the importer annually (but not only for this value chain). There is communication via 
e-mail, but actors would like to have more face-to-face meetings. A ‘Farm Quality Group’ provides advice 
to farmers on farm management practices.
Table 6 shows clearly the differences in network governance structures. The chains with a clear leader and 
support for shared governance are the most integrated chains. It is interesting to note that the most integrated 
chains (A-kiwi and C-venison) use (partly) non-coercive power to organise the product flow, and also have 
more intense communication and shared governance.
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 ■ Informal relationships
In the kiwi value chain permanent and good relationships exist between growers, post-harvest operators and 
the lead company as well as between the lead company and customers in which there is openness, trust, two-
way dialogue, integrity and respect. Transparency, incentive systems and belief in the single desk structure 
contribute to the relationships between the New Zealand actors. Relationships between growers and post-
harvest operators are also generally good. The role of trust is considered huge as it underpins every stage 
in the value chain, namely the trust that every actor in the value chain does a good job and acts to the best 
of its abilities. The commitment of growers is supported by consistent and safe returns, as well as by the 
shareholding system. Commitment to the chain is positively related to trust between the actors.
In the apple value chain relationships between lead company and the growers are good according to most 
growers. However, some growers do not want to commit their volumes to the lead company and therefore 
the lead company has partly vertically integrated by establishing its own orchards. Relationships between 
the lead company and post-harvest operators can be awkward as the lead company can be very stringent in 
what is accepted in terms of quality specifications of the apples. There are good relationships between the 
lead company and customers. In general, the focus of the value chain is more on vertical integration than 
on relationships. Trust, supported by communication, does support transactions in the value chain. There 
is trust in the accuracy and correctness of information received. Open communication and transparency (as 
stimulated by trust) contribute to commitment.
The venison value chain is characterised by tight and good relationships between farmers, slaughterhouse 
and the facilitator due to open communication. Moreover, there are good relationships between farmers and 
customers in the market due to face-to-face meetings and the emotional attachment of farmers to customers. 
Relationships between the facilitator and the European distributor are crucial for market orientation. In this 
regard, face-to-face meetings are crucial for building relationships. The role of trust is considered huge as 
it influences the willingness to share information and communicate and it replaces the need to constantly 
control and check the behaviour of other actors. There is trust in compliance with agreements, and the 
competences of other actors. The actors are also highly committed to the value chain, supported by the system 
of shareholding. Commitment results in actors spending more time, effort and resources on the value chain.
In the lamb value chain there are good and collaborative relationships between farmers and the processor due 
to a commitment to grow and develop the product in the market. There are also good business relationships 
Table 6. Network governance aspects for the four cases.
Leaderships Type of power Shared governance Facilitation
Case A: 
kiwi
Lead party 
is marketing 
organisation
Power based on sole entry 
point (coercive power)
Non-coercive power (based 
on competence trust)
Intense communication and 
consultation throughout the 
chain
Marketing, knowledge 
transfer and training
Case B: 
apple
Lead party 
is marketing 
organisation
Power partly based on 
vertical integration and 
contracts (coercive power)
Decisions taken by lead 
party; meetings to optimize 
product flow
Marketing, knowledge 
transfer and training 
Case C: 
venison
Lead party is 
facilitator
Power based on 
competence trust (non-
coercive power)
Intense communication and 
consultation throughout the 
chain
Marketing and customer 
contacts (supported by sector 
organization New Zealand)
Case D: 
lamb
No clear lead 
party
Slaughterhouse provides 
market access 
Limited communication 
between end-to-end chain 
partners
Some training organized by 
the farmer group
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between the processor and the importer (which are not limited to this chain). The importer has relationships 
with distributors however there is little connection to the final customer (restaurants and specialist butchers). 
Relationships between farmers and the importer are not optimal due to misunderstandings, possibly caused by 
a lack of face-to-face meetings (difficult due to geographical distance and lack of resources). The challenges 
related to volumes and prices put pressure on the trust present in the value chain. Many farmers are quite 
committed to the value chain due to their shareholding in the Farm Quality Group, shared passion and belief 
in the programme. However, not all farmers seem highly committed to delivering the volumes required in 
the market.
From Table 7 we see that trust and commitment are closely related to shared governance (Table 6) and 
(non-coercive) leadership. In the following section we will further analyse the relationships between market 
orientation and governance.
6. Discussion and conclusions
Table 8 gives insights into the main relationships between the concepts that we applied in our research. In 
three of the four value chains, there is a clear actor who has taken the leadership role. The absence of a leader 
in the lamb value chain could explain why this value chain is less market-oriented than the other three. There 
are typical similarities in the activities that reflect the leadership role:
 ■ All three leaders have a strong focus on markets and customers or, in other words, aim to create a 
market-oriented chain.
 ■ All three leaders are responsible for conducting intelligence-generating activities. The kiwi and apple 
lead parties conduct a large variety of intelligence-generating activities in their value chain and the 
venison chain conducts some of these activities.
 ■ All three leaders oversee the whole value chain from the farmers to the market. This enables the 
leader to facilitate intelligence communication from one end of the value chain to the other.
 ■ All three leaders are involved in optimising the product flow as they all communicate demand and 
supply with the different actors in the value chain and try to match these.
 ■ All three leaders influence the behaviour of other actors in the value chain and thereby support 
market responsiveness of the chain. For example, both fruit chains established detailed standards 
for growers and post-harvest operators. The lead party in the venison chain established an incentive 
system for farmers related to product specifications of the venison.
The points show that leadership in a value chain may contribute to market intelligence generation, 
communication and responsiveness, which is in line with the findings of Elg (2008) and Kahkonen and 
Tenkanen (2010).
The use of coercive power by the lead organisation can create tension in the relationship, because the lead 
organisation can force the other party to do things that this party would otherwise not have done (Leonidou et 
al., 2008). In kiwi value chain A, the impact of the use of coercive power on relationships between marketing 
organisation and farmers is moderate, as the shareholding structure in this chain gives growers the power to 
Table 7. Levels of trust and commitment in the four case chains.1
Trust Commitment
Case A: kiwi ++ ++
Case B: apple + +
Case C: venison ++ ++
Case D: lamb + +/-
1 ++: strong presence; +: moderate presence; +/-: limited presence of trust/commitment.
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take a stand if they do not agree with decisions or actions taken by the lead company. Moreover, alignment 
of actors in this chain is supported by the good relationships between the growers, post-harvest operators 
and the lead company. In addition, this chain has a special shared governance structure with its industry 
consultation groups, in which growers, post-harvest operators and the lead company are represented. These 
industry consultation groups meet once a month to discuss major industry issues, such as taste reviews. The 
meetings of the consultation groups contribute to intelligence communication through the value chain, since 
market information can be shared. In addition, the meetings contribute to responsiveness of the value chain 
as decisions can be taken about how to respond to market information, such as outcomes of sensory research.
In the apple value chain (B), the leader uses much more coercive power to align activities with its own 
objectives. Shared governance in this chain is at a lower level than the kiwi chain, as are trust and commitment. 
Another example of shared governance, in which part of the chain was governed by several actors, was found 
within the lamb and venison value chains, in which the farmers formed a farmers’ group. Within these farmer 
groups, there is communication on how farm management practices can be improved. The venison producer 
group in particular is characterised by strong collaboration between the farmers and also with other actors 
in the chain, as well as by social pressure between the farmers to apply good farming practices and on the 
other actors to perform in line with the common objectives. The existence of the venison producer group, 
and its strong collaboration with the facilitator, slaughterhouse and distributor in Europe, contributes to the 
responsiveness of the value chain. In venison value chain C the lead party applies non-coercive power based 
on competence trust. There is a high level of shared governance in this chain, as well as high levels of trust 
and commitment between the different actors. In lamb chain D no clear lead party is present, and, although 
there is close collaboration within the farmer group, shared governance and trust throughout the chain are 
moderate while commitment is lower than in the other chains.
Leadership can be supported by facilitation of market research, market intelligence communication throughout 
the chain and farmer support. Additionally, findings indicate that the facilitating role can be taken by a value 
chain actor as well as by an external organisation, that is not, or only to a very limited extent, involved in 
the product flow of the value chain. This is the case for the venison value chain.
Regarding contractual arrangements, in three of the four studied value chains, not just one but multiple types 
of bilateral agreements are being used. In the kiwi value chain there are written as well as equity-based 
agreements, while in the venison value chain we see (long-term) verbal agreements next to equity-based 
agreements. In the apple chain the focus is on written agreements and in the lamb chain on (long-term) 
verbal agreements. A clear finding in this research is that spot-market agreements are not used in any of 
the four value chains. Peterson et al. (2001) described spot-market contracts as being focused on the short 
Table 8. Overview of relationships between governance elements and market orientation of four case value 
chains.1
Case A:kiwi Case B: apple Case C: venison Case D: lamb
Chain leader ++ ++ ++ +/-
Shared governance ++ + ++ +/-
Facilitation ++ ++ + +/-
Strictness contract ++ ++ +/- +/-
Equity based ++ +/- ++ +/-
Trust ++ + ++ +
Commitment ++ + ++ +/-
Market intelligence ++ ++ ++ +/-
Communication ++ + ++ +
Responsiveness ++ + + -
1 ++: strong presence/attention; +: moderate presence/attention; +/-: limited presence/attention; -: lack of attention.
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term and associated with limited information exchange. Therefore, a certain level of integration might be 
conditional to being market-oriented.
6.1 Conclusions
Leadership was found to be an important characteristic of value chain governance as it could contribute to 
all three constructs of market orientation. The actor taking a leadership role has the ability to oversee the 
whole value chain and connect actors in the value chain, which contributes to intelligence communication. 
Additionally, the lead organisation is able to optimise the product flow and influence the behaviour of other 
value chain actors, both of which contribute to value chain responsiveness. The leader also performs activities 
aimed at gathering market information, which contributes to intelligence generation. Moreover, the leader can 
create and stimulate one common vision in the value chain, namely the focus on customers and consumers. 
By doing so, the leader can stimulate market orientation to be the common goal of the value chain.
Leadership was found to be closely related to facilitation, since the actor taking a leadership role can also 
act as a facilitator. The facilitator can provide other actors with knowledge and/or assistance, and thereby 
contribute to their responsiveness. Furthermore, facilitation can contribute to intelligence generation by 
conducting intelligence-generating activities.
Leadership can be the result of coercive and non-coercive sources of power. Non-coercive sources of power 
were found to have a positive effect on the informal relationships in the value chain. In contrast, the coercive 
sources of power had a negative impact on these informal relationships, as the lead organisation may force 
other actors to do things that these actors would otherwise not have done (Grunert et al., 2005; Kähkönen 
and Tenkanen, 2010; Leonidou et al., 2008). This can create tensions in the informal relationships. However, 
trust and commitment, as constructs of informal relationships, can contribute to all three constructs of 
market orientation, namely to intelligence communication (by increasing the willingness of actors to share 
information), responsiveness (by increasing the willingness of actors to dedicate time, effort and resources 
to the value chain) and intelligence generation (via their contribution to relationship quality and related 
information exchange). It was found that by involving different actors in the decision-making via shared 
governance, the negative impact of leadership on informal relationships could be decreased. Shared governance, 
characterised by the presence of many face-to-face meetings, also contributes to intelligence communication 
and responsiveness, as market information can be exchanged and decisions regarding responsiveness can 
be taken during these meetings. In addition to shared governance, shareholding of actors can also lower 
the negative impact of leadership on informal relationships. When actors have a shareholding in the value 
chain, they have the power to stand up if they do not agree with decisions or actions taken by the leader.
6.2 Management implications, limitations and further research
Based on the insights obtained in this research, recommendations can be made to actors of global food value 
chains, which aim to be market-oriented. The insights from this research can be used by value chain actors 
to analyse their value chain and find points for improvement in order to increase their market orientation. 
In addition, all of these aspects of governance are interrelated and can therefore positively or negatively 
influence each other. For example, leadership in particular was found to contribute to market orientation 
in several ways. However, when using coercive power, leadership can also have a negative impact on the 
informal relationships in the value chain, while these informal relationships are important contributors to 
market orientation. Therefore, special attention must be paid to these informal relationships.
 ■ Further research
This exploratory research into market orientation and value chain governance has delivered new insights for 
further research. First, only a little research has been performed on market orientation of value chains (e.g. 
Grunert et al., 2005). Even less research has been performed on the governance of value chains. This study 
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contributes strongly to the literature in the field of market orientation as well as value chain governance. 
For the latter in particular, we have designed an innovative theoretical framework, combining insights from 
contract theory (e.g. Williamson, 1991), social network theory (e.g. Lu et al., 2012) and network governance 
(e.g. Provan and Kenis, 2008).
The framework and approach can be used by other scholars and add to our insights in market orientation 
and value chain governance.
This research has several limitations. The research assessed the contribution of governance to market 
orientation. The effect of the level of market orientation on the performance of the value chain (for example, 
profitability) was not investigated. Moreover, governance costs of the value chain were also not included in 
the study. Further research may include these elements.
Four chains were addressed in this exploratory research to arrive at new insights into the relationships 
between market orientation and value chain governance. As the number of chains and the qualitative research 
performed in each of these chains must be considered rather limited, further research should focus on more 
and more differentiated chains from different sectors, with more quantitative based in-depth research.
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